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MY EARS HEAR MORE THAN ENGLISH: 
GRANTING MULTILINGUAL JURORS 
ACCOMMODATIONS AND TREATING 
MULTILINGUALISM AS A COMMON  
TYPE OF JUROR EXPERTISE 
Abstract: To find an example of court-sanctioned discrimination against Span-
ish-speaking prospective jurors, one need not look further than the 2011 U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision in United States v. Cabrera-
Beltran. Three multilingual jurors were struck for cause during voir dire for not 
agreeing to ignore all Spanish-language evidence that would be presented at tri-
al and adhere solely to the English-language interpretation, even if they detected 
errors in the interpretation. Although these jurors could have been accommodat-
ed, the court upheld the decision to strike them. In other cases, jurors with other 
types of expertise typically have not been asked to abandon their expertise dur-
ing a trial, nor have they been subject to for-cause challenges on the basis of 
their skills. This Note argues that multilingual jurors should be provided appro-
priate accommodations for their linguistic skills, and that they, like other expert 
jurors, should typically not be subject to for-cause challenges because they pos-
sess particular skills. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court: [I]f you were to believe that the translators were not accurate-
ly translating what the witness might be saying, would you be able to base 
your decision on what the translator has said, or would you have prob-
lems with that? 
Prospective Juror # 2: It would depend on, you know, what was said. If, 
you know, the difference. I couldn’t give you a specific yes-or-no answer.
1
 
In 2011, in United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit held that Prospective Juror Number Two, along with 
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 1 United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 748 (4th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1935 (2012). 
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two other Spanish-speaking jurors, was properly excluded “for cause.”2 Mul-
tilingual3 prospective jurors, according to the Fourth Circuit, could be ex-
cluded if they had any doubts about their ability to ignore original Spanish-
language evidence in favor of English-language interpretations or transla-
tions.4 In Cabrera-Beltran, prospective jurors were asked to accept English-
language interpretations even if they believed that they heard mistakes in the 
interpretations.5 
Given that the defendant in Cabrera-Beltran was charged with the dis-
tribution of drugs, a crime carrying significant penalties, an egregious inter-
pretation or translation error at trial could have had serious implications.6 
Nevertheless, these jurors were asked during voir dire to discount all such 
future errors at trial before ever having heard any testimony and without 
knowing the nature and magnitude of any potential errors.7 Provided that a 
juror understands English, for-cause strikes in this situation can only impact 
multilingual jurors, as monolingual English-speakers would not be able to 
readily identify errors in interpretation.8 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See id. at 747, 750. 
 3 Although a number of cases cited in this Note involved bilingual prospective jurors, I have 
used the term “multilingual” throughout to include jurors who speak more than two languages. See 
infra notes 4–225 and accompanying text. All future uses of the term “multilingual” assume that 
the juror has an understanding of English, because the law requires an understanding of English 
for federal jury service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2) (2012). Spanish is the most common language 
spoken in the United States after English, with thirteen percent of the population aged five or older 
speaking it at home. Language Spoken at Home: 2013 American Community Survey 1-Year Esti-
mates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter Language Spoken at Home], available at http://factfinder.
census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_13_1YR_S1601&prodType=
table, archived at http://perma.cc/9ESW-W2AU. 
 4 See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 747–50. This Note uses the term “translation” to mean 
“[t]he transference of meaning of a written document from the source language into the target 
language in writing.” 5 U.S. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY 
§ 140, at 4 (rev. 2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/
Guide_Vol05.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M4P2-32H2. “Interpretation,” in contrast, refers to 
“[t]he rendering of the full and accurate meaning of speech from one language into another . . . .” 
Id. § 140, at 3 (defining “simultaneous interpretation”). Some courts ignore the document-versus-
speech distinction between the terms and thus use them interchangeably. See, e.g., Hernandez v. 
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 356–57, 360–61 (1991) (plurality opinion) (conflating interpretation and 
translation); Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 748 (same). 
 5 See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 748. 
 6 See id. at 746. 
 7 See id. at 747–48 (inquiring whether prospective jurors would be willing to accept official 
Spanish-to-English interpretations even if the jurors thought the interpreters “were not accurately” 
interpreting witness testimony). 
 8 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that peremptory strikes 
involving the willingness to abide by a translation would “inevitably result in a disproportionate 
disqualification of Spanish-speaking venirepersons” as compared to monolingual English-speaking 
jurors). A person who does not understand English cannot serve as a juror in the federal courts. 28 
U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2). 
2015] Multilingual Perspective Jurors and For-Cause Strikes 1251 
This Note argues that for-cause strikes against multilingual jurors on the 
basis of their language skills are unjust and should not be upheld.9 Part I re-
views the law regarding strikes of prospective jurors during voir dire, the 
treatment of foreign language evidence, and the permissible methods for ju-
rors to ask questions during trial in some instances.10 Part II draws a compari-
son between expert jurors who are not subject to for-cause challenges on the 
basis of the expertise they possess and multilingual jurors who in some in-
stances have been subject to for-cause challenges.11 Finally, Part III argues 
that courts should treat multilingual jurors similarly to other expert jurors and 
should not subject multilingual jurors to for-cause strikes out of fear or dis-
trust.12 
I. PEREMPTORY STRIKES OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS: HOW RACE-BASED 
STRIKES BECAME PROHIBITED, WHILE LANGUAGE-BASED  
STRIKES ARE SOMETIMES STILL PERMITTED  
Understanding how the Fourth Circuit came to allow the for-cause ex-
clusions of multilingual jurors requires a background on race- and language-
based peremptory strikes and how jurors are normally expected to react to 
foreign language evidence.13 Section A reviews the basic elements of the jury 
selection process and strikes against prospective jurors.14 Section B discusses 
the 1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky, where the U.S. Supreme Court artic-
ulated the standard for reviewing race-based peremptory strikes.15 Section C 
then explains the 1991 decision in Hernandez v. New York, where the U.S. 
Supreme Court attempted to provide clarity with respect to peremptory 
strikes against multilingual jurors.16 Section D focuses on how jurors should 
consider foreign language evidence at trial.17 Finally, Section E discusses 
how jurors with concerns about evidence are sometimes able to ask questions 
during trial.18 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See infra notes 170–225 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 13–117 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 118–169 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 170–225 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 19–117 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 19–34 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 35–42 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 43–69 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 70–87 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 88–117 and accompanying text. 
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A. Jury Selection and Voir Dire 
Juries for federal trials are chosen by a complex system of rules partially 
governed by federal laws, but largely developed by local courts.19 The Jury 
Selection and Service Act of 1968 requires courts to create lists of prospective 
jurors, sourcing the names from lists of registered or actual voters, and to 
supplement the lists as needed from other sources.20 Although federal law 
establishes minimum requirements for eligibility for jury duty,21 the Jury Se-
lection and Service Act requires each federal district court to devise its own 
plan for randomly selecting jury members.22 
One key part of the federal jury selection process is the juror background 
interview process called voir dire.23 A randomly selected pool of prospective 
jurors called the venire is interviewed to determine whether the jurors will be 
assigned to a given trial.24 The preferences of individual judges determine 
whether the interviews are conducted primarily by the judge in charge of the 
case or by the attorneys.25 Federal law provides that even if the judge chooses 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (2012) (governing the random selection of jurors). District courts 
must promulgate jury selection plans. Id. § 1863(a). See generally U.S. DIST. CT. E.D. CAL., JU-
ROR MANAGEMENT PLAN (rev. 2010), available at http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/assets/
File/493.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X32H-8RBU (providing local rules for the Eastern Dis-
trict of California); U.S. DIST. CT. S.D. W. VA., PLAN PRESCRIBING METHOD FOR THE COMPOSI-
TION OF JURY WHEELS AND THE QUALIFICATION AND RANDOM SELECTION OF GRAND AND PET-
IT JURORS (rev. 2103), available at http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/pdfs/JuryPlanandOrderas
ApprovedbyJudicialCouncil.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XT9B-3J2S (providing local rules for 
the Southern District of West Virginia). 
 20 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2); see U.S. DIST. CT. E.D. CAL., supra note 19, § 2.01 (using “county 
voter registration lists”); U.S. DIST. CT. S.D. W. VA., supra note 19, § 2.3 (using “lists of actual 
voters”). Massachusetts uses a list of residents of the Commonwealth as opposed to a list of vot-
ers. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (explicitly excepting Massachusetts from the more typical means of 
selecting jurors that other states must abide by); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234A, § 10 (West 
2000 & Supp. 2015) (specifying the details of the “numbered resident list”). 
 21 28 U.S.C. § 1865. Eligibility requirements for a prospective juror include being a citizen of 
the United States who is 18 years old or older, and who has been a resident in the federal judicial 
district for at least one year. Id. Additionally, there are minimum English language proficiency 
requirements and requirements to be mentally and physically capable to serve. See id. Finally, 
convictions for certain crimes may exclude a person from being eligible to serve on a jury. See id. 
 22 Id. § 1863(a). 
 23 See 9 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 47.10 (3d ed. 2013) (noting that voir dire helps to 
ensure a defendant’s constitutional “right to an impartial jury”). “Voir dire” is “[a] preliminary 
examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified 
and suitable to serve on a jury.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1805 (10th ed. 2014). In the federal 
courts, statutory requirements plus procedural rules set forth the basic requirements for voir dire. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1870; FED. R. CIV. P. 47; FED. R. CRIM. P. 24. 
 24 See KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 3:8 
(6th ed. 2013); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 1789. 
 25 See FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(1); Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 356 (plurality 
opinion) (noting that the state trial court “talked to” prospective jurors during voir dire and that the 
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to conduct each juror interview, they must allow the attorneys to pose ques-
tions to prospective jurors where the questions are proper.26 
Voir dire includes both attorneys excluding some jurors biased against 
their clients’ cases and attorneys seeking to include other jurors who are either 
neutral or favorably disposed toward their clients’ cases.27 In theory, one ob-
jective of voir dire is to root out and exclude any jurors with expressed or sit-
uationally implied biases for or against any party to the trial.28 A judge may 
grant an unlimited number of challenges “for cause” against jurors who have 
expressed biases or who have an obvious interest in the outcome of the pro-
ceedings.29 For-cause challenges cannot be used at an attorney’s whim be-
cause prospective jurors are presumed to be impartial, absent proof to the 
contrary.30 
                                                                                                                           
prosecutor was allowed to ask them questions); infra note 26 and accompanying text (citing cases 
where judges asked questions during voir dire). 
 26 FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a) (allowing proper attorney questioning in civil cases); FED. R. CRIM. P. 
24(a)(2) (allowing proper attorney questioning in criminal cases). The trial court determines which 
questions are “proper,” subject to an abuse of discretion standard on appeal. See United States v. 
DePugh, 452 F.2d 915, 921–22 (10th Cir. 1971). A trial court has substantial discretion in decid-
ing which questions are proper during voir dire provided that the court crafts a voir dire procedure 
designed to generate an “impartial jury.” See Ratliff v. Schiber Truck Co., 150 F.3d 949, 956 (8th 
Cir. 1998). What is “proper” varies from case to case. See, e.g., Smith v. Tenet Healthsystem SL, 
Inc., 436 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding the district court’s decision to reject questions 
that would have required jurors to respond at length); Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1114–15 
(9th Cir. 1981) (reversing a trial court that prevented prospective jurors from being questioned as 
to whether they would find the testimony of law enforcement officials more credible than other 
witnesses); Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 622 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1980) (reversing a district 
court’s refusal to allow the defendant in a negligence case to ask whether jurors or their families 
had ever received injuries in rear-end collisions). 
 27 See GORDON BERMANT & JOHN SHAPARD, THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION, JUROR CHAL-
LENGES, AND ADVERSARY ADVOCACY 1 (1978) (discussing how defense attorneys in a 1975 
murder trial “‘bought’ the verdict” acquitting their client of murder, thanks in part to spending 
money on “an extensive, systematic jury selection exercise”); JAMES J. GOBERT ET AL., JURY 
SELECTION: THE LAW, ART AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY § 10:1 (2013) (describing voir 
dire as a process of removing potential jurors who the parties’ attorneys perceive to be undesira-
ble). 
 28 O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 24, § 4:8 (noting that some voir dire challenges target pro-
spective jurors with “some actual or implied bias or prejudice”). 
 29 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1866(c), 1870 (2012); O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 24, § 4:8; see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 47(c) (allowing a trial court to “excuse a juror for good cause” at any point 
“[d]uring trial or deliberation” in a civil case). 
 30 See Moran v. Clarke, 443 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The courts presume that a pro-
spective juror is impartial, and a party seeking to strike a venire member for cause must show that 
the prospective juror is unable to lay aside his or her impressions or opinions and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court.”); see also 9 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 
23, § 47.20[1] (“In the absence of facts pointing to presumptive bias, a prospective juror is pre-
sumed to be impartial.”). 
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Attorneys, however, are not solely interested in excluding jurors with 
expressed or situationally implied biases; they are also interested in excluding 
jurors that the attorneys suspect may be unfavorably disposed toward their 
clients.31 To this end, federal law allots each attorney a limited number of 
peremptory challenges.32 No hidden bias needs to be proven to use these per-
emptory challenges.33 Any juror who is successfully challenged for cause, or 
who is the target of a peremptory challenge, is excused from service on that 
trial, while prospective jurors who survive the process may be impanelled on 
the case.34 
B. Race-Based Juror Challenges During Voir Dire 
Challenges during voir dire cannot be intentionally targeted against pro-
tected classes of citizens because of their membership in particular racial or 
national origin groups.35 In Batson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that race-
based peremptory challenges violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.36 The Court further held that peremptory challenges may 
not be used under the assumption that all prospective jurors of a given race 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See 9 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 23, § 47.30 (discussing the use of peremp-
tory challenges to remove jurors with “unacknowledged or unconscious bias”). Compare Bailey v. 
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Alachua Cnty., 956 F.2d 1112, 1128 (11th Cir. 1992) (discussing a juror 
who should have been struck for cause because they knew the plaintiff and a number of witnesses 
in the case), and 9 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 23, § 47.20[1] (discussing strikes 
due to express or implied bias), with BERMANT & SHAPARD, supra note 27, at 1 (discussing the 
uses of various types of strikes to shape a winning jury). 
 32 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (noting that each side has three peremptory challenges in federal civil 
litigation); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (noting that each side has anywhere from three to twenty per-
emptory challenges in federal criminal cases, depending on the severity of the defendant’s of-
fense). 
 33 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 374 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 
146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)) (explaining that peremptory challenges may be exercised in an “arbi-
trary and capricious” manner); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (quoting United States 
v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (D. Conn. 1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States 
v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977)) (noting that although prosecutors cannot make race-
based challenges to prospective jurors, they are typically “entitled to exercise permitted perempto-
ry challenges ‘for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to [their] view[s] concerning 
the outcome’ of the case to be tried”). 
 34 See 9 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 23, §§ 47.20[1], 47.30; GORDON BER-
MANT, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 14–21 (1982). “Impanel” means 
“[t]o swear in (a jury) to try an issue or case.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 638, 
869. 
 35 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012) (prohibiting jurors from being excluded from jury service based 
on “race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.”); Batson, 476 U.S. at 88 (“[T]he 
Constitution prohibits all forms of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of jurors.”). 
 36 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 88, 100. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
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will be biased and unable to serve.37 Prior case law had focused on prohibit-
ing discrimination in the selection of the venire, but Batson expanded protec-
tions to petit jury selection as well.38 
In reaching its decision, the Court established a three-part test to prove a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause in peremptory challenges involving 
race.39 First, the defendant has to establish a prima facie case that the prose-
cutor used race-based challenges.40 Second, the prosecutor bears the burden 
of proffering a race-neutral reason for using peremptory challenges against 
the jurors.41 Finally, the court must decide whether the defendant has proven 
intentional discrimination in the use of the peremptory challenge process.42 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to chal-
lenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a 
group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant.”). 
 38 Id. at 95–96 (discussing how case law had developed since Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202 (1965), overruled by Batson, 476 U.S. 79, and ultimately concluding that a prima facie case of 
discrimination may also be established by evidence of the discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges). A “petit jury” is “[a] jury ([usually] consisting of 6 or 12 persons) summoned and empan-
eled in the trial of a specific case.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 987. 
 39 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358 (plurality opinion) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98). 
 40 Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97). One way a prima facie case might be established is 
by proving “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against” jurors of a given racial group. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 
97. Such a pattern may be demonstrated by showing that the “percentage of strikes against minori-
ty prospective jurors surpasses the proportion of minority jurors on the venire.” Ikedi O. Onye-
maobim, Comment, Batson Challenges at Work: Jury Selection in the Realm of Employment Law, 
A.B.A. (Jan. 13, 2015), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/employment/articles/winter
2015-0115-batson-challengers-work-jury-selection-realm-employment-law.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/W5CD-FMGD (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005)). In Hernandez, the 
trial court did not reach a conclusion as to whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case 
of discrimination, and the U.S. Supreme Court thought the issue was moot because the “prosecu-
tor ha[d] offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court ha[d] 
ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination.” See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. 
 41 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358–59 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97–98). In Hernandez, a majori-
ty of the court agreed that striking prospective jurors who expressed “difficulty in accepting the 
[interpreter’s] rendition of Spanish-language testimony” was a race-neutral reason for striking 
jurors. See id. at 361. Nevertheless, a prosecutor's allegedly race-neutral reason may be rejected as 
pretextual where their peremptory challenges were not made evenhandedly to jurors of different 
races who were similarly motivated to bias the outcome of the case. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 
U.S. 472, 482–85 (2008). 
 42 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98). According to a 1996 study, 
only 62.23% of all complainants alleging a Batson violation established a prima facie case. Ken-
neth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 460 (1996). Only 17.59% of those challenges where a pri-
ma facie Batson violation existed were successful. Id. 
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C. Peremptory Challenges of Multilingual Jurors 
Five years after Batson, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
peremptory challenges of multilingual jurors.43 In Hernandez, the Supreme 
Court held that multilingual prospective jurors could be lawfully excused via 
peremptory challenges if the prospective jurors appeared hesitant to adopt the 
Spanish-to-English evidentiary interpretations of a court interpreter.44 Be-
cause Spanish language evidence was to be considered in the case, the prose-
cutor asked the bilingual prospective jurors whether they would be willing to 
rely solely on English language interpretations provided through a court in-
terpreter, rather than considering their own interpretations of original Spanish 
language evidence.45 Each of the Spanish-speaking jurors hesitated in an-
swering the prosecutor’s question, and as a result, the prosecutor issued per-
emptory challenges to the jurors.46 The Hernandez Court applied the three-
part test from Batson in considering the peremptory challenges of these pro-
spective jurors.47 The Court held that potential hesitancy by the prospective 
jurors to rely solely on a court interpreter’s interpretation of Spanish-language 
evidence was a race-neutral explanation for the challenge.48 
The Court split over the Equal Protection analysis because of the impact 
this type of challenge would have on prospective bilingual jurors, with six 
justices agreeing on the judgment but with no more than four signing on to 
any one opinion.49 Justice Anthony Kennedy announced the judgment of the 
Court and delivered a plurality opinion in which Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist and Justices Byron White and David Souter joined.50 In spite of 
agreeing that the peremptory challenges in Hernandez had been race-neutral, 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality was concerned that such challenges could eventu-
ally cause a high percentage of bilingual jurors to be excluded from jury ser-
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355–57, 372. 
 44 See id. 
 45 Id. at 356–57. 
 46 Id. at 356–58; see also Eric N. Einhorn, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama 
ex rel. T.B.: Is the Peremptory Challenge Still Preeminent?, 36 B.C. L. REV. 161, 179 (1994) 
(discussing the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges of these prospective jurors). 
 47 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358–59. 
 48 See id. at 372. 
 49 See id. at 355–79. Four opinions were filed in Hernandez. See id. Justice Anthony Kennedy 
announced the opinion of the court, and delivered a plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist and Justices Byron White and David Souter joined. Id. at 354–72. Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Antonin Scalia joined. 
Id. at 372–75 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissent joined by Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall. Id. at 375–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Harry A. Blackmun filed 
his own short dissent, which agreed with part of Justice Stevens’ dissent. Id. at 375 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 50 See id. at 355 (plurality opinion). 
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vice.51 Thus, the plurality considered the potential disparate impact of this 
type of challenge and whether it might be evidence of racially motivated 
strikes.52 The plurality observed that past precedent provided that an “invidi-
ous discriminatory purpose” may be inferred from the totality of the facts in-
cluding the disproportionate, negative racial impact of a government policy.53 
The plurality concluded that unless the prosecutor had made peremptory 
challenges to cause a disparate negative impact against multilingual prospec-
tive jurors, it would not violate Batson’s requirement that the challenges be 
racially neutral.54 To that end, the plurality considered whether the prosecu-
tor’s excuse for his peremptory strikes—the hesitation of the jurors answering 
his questions about their willingness to adhere strictly to the English-language 
interpretations—could have been pretextual.55 To arrive at their ultimate an-
swer, the plurality applied a “no clear error” standard in deciding to support 
the trial court’s determination that there was no discriminatory intent shown 
in the peremptory strikes.56 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, joined by Justice 
Antonin Scalia, concurred in the Court’s judgment, but stated that the plurali-
ty should have observed the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence 
and considered only intentional discrimination without considering the per-
emptory challenges’ negative racial impact.57 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See id. at 362–63, 372; infra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the views of the 
Hernandez dissenters along with those of commentators that multilingual jurors will be dispropor-
tionately excluded from service by language-based challenges). Justice Kennedy’s plurality was 
particularly concerned by the “harsh paradox” that one must be English-proficient to serve on a 
federal jury, but at the same time one can face a peremptory challenge based on knowledge of 
English plus a second language. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371; see Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. 
New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 51–54 (1992) 
(commenting on Justice Kennedy’s “harsh paradox”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2)–(3) (requir-
ing English proficiency for jury service). 
 52 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362–63 (plurality opinion). 
 53 See id. at 363 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). 
 54 See id. at 362. The plurality for the Court explained: 
But even if we knew that a high percentage of bilingual jurors would hesitate in an-
swering questions [about ignoring the Spanish-language evidence] and, as a conse-
quence, would be excluded under the prosecutor's criterion [that the jurors could be 
excluded because they hesitated in answering his questions], that fact alone would 
not cause the criterion to fail the race-neutrality test. . . . Unless the government ac-
tor adopted a criterion with the intent of causing the impact asserted, that impact it-
self does not violate the principle of race neutrality. 
Id. 
 55 See id. at 363–69. 
 56 See id. at 369, 372. 
 57 See id. at 372–75 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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The dissenters were somewhat divided about the Equal Protection anal-
ysis.58 Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall and 
supported, in part, by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, would have rejected the 
prosecutor’s supposedly race-neutral reason for challenging the jurors as just 
a “proxy” for intentional discrimination.59 Justice Stevens worried that Span-
ish-speaking prospective jurors would be at risk of being disproportionately 
excused as a result of peremptory challenges under the holding of Hernan-
dez.60 In a part of Justice Stevens’ dissent, only joined by Justice Marshall, 
Justice Stevens focused heavily on past Equal Protection precedents, which 
provided that racially motivated treatment may be inferred from sufficient 
disparate racial impact taken together with the rest of the facts of the case.61 
Seven justices—the plurality and the three dissenters—agreed that there 
were limits on striking bilingual jurors.62 The plurality suggested a potential 
accommodation for bilingual jurors in future cases: the defendant could pro-
pose that bilingual jurors be impanelled and allowed to inform the trial court 
of potential errors they observed that were committed by the court interpret-
er.63 The plurality concluded that if the prosecutor opposed that accommoda-
tion, then this refusal could be evidence of a racially-biased motivation for the 
peremptory challenge.64 The dissenters agreed with the use of the Hernandez 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See id. at 375 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (agreeing only with Part II of Justice Stevens’ 
dissent, which rejected the prosecutor’s explanation for his peremptory strikes against Spanish-
speaking prospective jurors). 
 59 Id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 60 See id. Justice Stevens’ concern may be well-founded, because multilingual jurors may be 
unable to simply “tune out” the foreign language testimony that they hear. See Anthony Fassano, 
Note, The Rashomon Effect, Jury Instructions, and Peremptory Challenges: Rethinking Hernandez 
v. New York, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 783, 796–97 (2010). Furthermore, without any knowledge about 
the testimony of the witness, the competency of the interpreter, and the nature of the potential 
error, a multilingual juror may be unable to answer questions in the abstract about whether he or 
she will abide exclusively by a court interpreter’s English-language interpretation where the juror 
believes it to be materially different than the original foreign language testimony. See Perea, supra 
note 51, at 29–34. 
 61 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 376–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977); Washington, 426 U.S. at 242) (“An 
avowed justification that has a significant disproportionate impact will rarely qualify as a legiti-
mate, race-neutral reason sufficient to rebut the prima facie case because disparate impact is itself 
evidence of the discriminatory purpose.”). 
 62 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364 (plurality opinion); id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 63 Id. at 364 (plurality opinion). This Note refers to this accommodation as “the Hernandez 
accommodation.” See infra notes 64–225 and accompanying text. 
 64 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364 (plurality opinion). In addition to proposing the Hernandez 
accommodation, Justice Kennedy’s plurality also opined that if bilingual jurors were challenged 
only because they spoke Spanish, this could be merely a “pretext for racial discrimination.” See id. 
at 371–72. 
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accommodation.65 In short, although the judgment of the Court in Hernandez 
was that there were no clearly unconstitutional uses of peremptory challenges 
in that particular case, seven members of the Court supported a method to 
accommodate multilingual prospective jurors in future cases.66 
Although the plurality and the dissenters in Hernandez could not agree 
on whether the peremptory challenges had been valid, the seven justices 
found some common ground on the issue of future for-cause challenges based 
on language.67 The plurality implied that a multilingual juror’s hesitation to 
accept a court interpreter’s Spanish-to-English interpretation could be the ba-
sis for a “valid for-cause challenge.”68 The dissenting justices in Hernandez 
rejected mere hesitation during voir dire as a valid basis for a language-based 
peremptory challenge, but they nevertheless concluded that a multilingual 
juror’s unwillingness to accept an interpreter’s Spanish-to-English interpreta-
tion of testimony could be grounds for a for-cause challenge rather than just a 
peremptory challenge.69 
D. How Jurors Interact with Foreign Language Evidence 
In federal court, English is the language of the trial record for appellate 
review.70 In cases where a witness testifies in a foreign language at trial, only 
the English language interpretation is usually transcribed by the court report-
er.71 As a result, unless an error in interpretation of oral testimony is raised at 
trial, it may be difficult or impossible to raise a claim on appeal that there was 
an error in interpretation, because typically only the resulting English inter-
pretation is preserved.72 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 66 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 372 (plurality opinion) (expressing the judgment of the Court 
that there were no clear Batson violations during voir dire); id. at 364 (proposing the Hernandez 
accommodation); id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same). 
 67 See id. at 362–63 (plurality opinion); id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 68 See id. at 362–63 (plurality opinion); see also Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 749 (discussing 
Hernandez). 
 69 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 378–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 70 See United States v. Boria, 371 F. Supp. 1068, 1069 (D.P.R. 1973), aff’d, 518 F.2d 368 (1st 
Cir. 1975); Perea, supra note 51, at 34–37. 
 71 See Perea, supra note 51, at 34–37. The nearly exclusive use of English in the federal trial 
record is even true in Puerto Rico, where the majority of the population speaks Spanish as its pri-
mary language. See Andrea Freeman, Linguistic Colonialism: Law, Independence, and Language 
Rights in Puerto Rico, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 179, 185–86 (2010). 
 72 Perea, supra note 51, at 37 (“[Non-English] testimony is usually not preserved in any way. 
The failure to preserve testimony in non-English languages makes impossible meaningful appel-
late review of the accuracy of interpretations.”); see also Freeman, supra note 71, at 185–86 (not-
ing that in the federal courts in Puerto Rico, jurists are likely to make their decisions based on 
witness testimony made in Spanish, but the court reporter creates the official record—which will 
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Although court interpreters are generally qualified professionals, some 
can and do make mistakes in interpretations.73 Sometimes the errors can be 
subtle differences such as how formal or polite the interpreter makes the orig-
inal witness seem, which may in turn bias jurors for or against the witness.74 
At other times, errors in interpretation can be more egregious, such as when 
an interpreter misunderstands a witness or takes liberties with an interpreta-
tion.75 For example, in one case where the witness said they were, “going to 
‘chat with’ the victim,” the interpreter said the witness testified they were 
“going to ‘kill’ the victim.”76 
 In addition to English-language translations or interpretations, a jury 
can also consider original foreign language testimony as evidence during tri-
al.77 One form of foreign language evidence that juries may consider is a rec-
orded conversation.78 Some jurisdictions have ruled that foreign language 
recordings, rather than English transcriptions, are the “real evidence” at tri-
al.79 The evidentiary value of transcriptions of those foreign language record-
                                                                                                                           
presumably be used on appeal—based on English-language interpretations of Spanish-language 
primary evidence). 
 73 See Marina Hsieh, “Language-Qualifying” Juries to Exclude Bilingual Speakers, 66 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1181, 1189 (2001) (providing a table of some noteworthy instances where the original for-
eign-language testimony and the English-language interpretation varied substantially); Sarah B. 
Clasby, Note, Understanding Testimony: Official Translation and Bilingual Jurors in Hernandez 
v. New York, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 515, 531–32 (1992) (noting that interpreters can 
change the features of testimony such as the level of formality and verb tense, but in the process, 
they may also “slant what a speaker is trying to say” because of their personal biases). 
 74 See Perea, supra note 51, at 24–25; Clasby, supra note 73, at 531–32. 
 75 See Clasby, supra note 73, at 532. A few examples of particularly egregious errors in inter-
pretation include: 
1) The witness said, “as for the Vietnamese, I never associate with them,” but the in-
terpreter merely said, “no.” 
2) The question, “Do you remember the day [defendant] sexually assaulted you?” 
was translated as, “Do you remember the day [defendant] made love to you?” 
3) The witness said, “I don’t even have ‘ten cents,’” but the interpreter said, “I don’t 
even have ‘ten kilos.’” 
Hsieh, supra note 73, at 1189 (alteration in original). 
 76 Hsieh, supra note 73, at 1189. 
 77 See United States v. Montor-Torres, 449 F. App’x 820, 822–23 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting 
that the defendant was offered the opportunity to play foreign language tapes as evidence); United 
States v. Cruz, 765 F.2d 1020, 1024 (11th Cir. 1985) (allowing jurors to hear a foreign language 
recording to consider factors such as the changes in the “voice modulation” of speakers over the 
course of the recording). 
 78 See Montor-Torres, 449 F. App’x at 823; Cruz, 765 F.2d at 1023–24. 
 79 See Cruz, 765 F.2d at 1023 (“What was said at the time it was recorded is what the real 
evidence is, the transcripts are not. They are merely to help you identify [the speakers]. But in this 
situation where we have a foreign language tape they also inevitably provide you content of the 
conversation as well.” (citation omitted)); accord Montor-Torres, 449 F. App’x at 822 (quoting 
Cruz, 765 F.2d at 1023) (“[English-language t]ranscripts may be used as substantive evidence to 
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ings is disputed, with some jurisdictions ruling that they have independent 
evidentiary value, while other jurisdictions give transcriptions no independent 
evidentiary value.80 
Even when they do not understand the language of a recording, mono-
lingual English speakers may be able to gain something from analyzing for-
eign language evidence directly.81 For example, when considering spoken 
testimony in a foreign language, monolingual English-speaking jurors are 
able to listen to a speaker’s vocal pitch, volume, or speed to draw conclusions 
about the speaker.82 A witness may also be able to identify the voice of a par-
ticular speaker from listening to a recording, allowing jurors to consider the 
credibility of that “witness’s voice identification.”83  
There is no legal requirement that jurors be able to understand the lan-
guage used in a foreign language recording admitted into evidence.84 Never-
theless, where English-speaking jurors are to consider recorded evidence in a 
foreign language, English-language transcripts of the conversations will like-
ly be required.85 Where the parties to the trial can agree upon an interpreta-
                                                                                                                           
aid the jury in determining the real issue presented, the content and meaning of the [Spanish-
language] tape recording.”); cf. United States v. Aisenberg, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 
2000) (opining that “the evidence is the recordings and not the transcripts” in the context of an 
English-language transcript of an English-language recording). 
 80 Compare Montor-Torres, 449 F. App’x at 822 (holding that transcripts may be considered 
as “substantive evidence”), with United States v. Nunez, 532 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that transcripts typically have no “independent weight”). 
 81 See Cruz, 765 F.2d at 1024. 
 82 See id. (noting that the court “played the tape recording for the jury and had an interpreter 
signal the jury when it was appropriate to turn the pages of the transcript,” and explaining that this 
process “enabled the jury to detect changes in voice modulation and note any hesitancies or other 
characteristics which might give meaning to the tape recording”). But see Clifford S. Fishman, 
Recordings, Transcripts, and Translations as Evidence, 81 WASH. L. REV. 473, 517 & n.177 
(2006) (arguing that jurors should be thwarted in their “attempts to rely on inflections and empha-
ses in the foreign language that they do not understand”). 
 83 See Montor-Torres, 449 F. App’x at 823 (citing United States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903, 915 
(5th Cir. 1979)); see also FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5) (stating that a witness may offer opinion evi-
dence about the identity of a speaker in a recording). 
 84 United States v. Llinas, 603 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1979) (observing that if jurors were 
required to understand all foreign language evidence presented at trial without the aid of an inter-
preter, “persons would be free to engage in conspiracies in this country without fear that the gov-
ernment could show direct evidence of the conspiracy, as long as the conspirators addressed each 
other in a foreign language”). 
 85 See Nunez, 532 F.3d at 651 (citing United States v. Camargo, 908 F.2d 179, 183 (7th 
Cir.1990)) (“Transcripts of recorded conversations are a virtual necessity when the conversations 
take place in Spanish and are admitted into evidence before an English-speaking jury.”); Cruz, 765 
F.2d at 1023 (“[W]here we have a foreign language tape [transcripts] also inevitably provide [ju-
rors] content of the conversation as well.”); Fishman, supra note 82, at 517 (opining that translated 
transcriptions of foreign language recordings should be handed out to jurors because they will be 
unable to understand the original recordings). 
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tion of a recording, a single official English-language transcript may be creat-
ed.86 Otherwise, each party may need to submit its own English-language 
transcript for the jurors to consider.87 
E. Jurors Asking Questions During Trial 
 Understandably, when a multilingual prospective juror can understand 
evidence in a foreign language that other jurors will need an interpreter to 
understand, potential problems may arise.88 There are a number of ways 
courts have accommodated this knowledge rather than simply striking multi-
lingual prospective jurors outright.89 Subsection 1 explains a standard jury 
instruction that instructs jurors to pay attention only to the English-language 
interpretations and translations developed on the record, but also discusses 
jurisdictions that allow multilingual jurors to direct their concerns about an 
interpretation or translation to the court.90 Subsection 2 discusses the possible 
genesis of the Hernandez accommodation and how it could work in prac-
tice.91 Finally, Subsection 3 explores a recent method that allows all jurors to 
anonymously propose questions to witnesses.92 
1. Pattern Jury Instructions Governing Foreign Language Evidence 
Although foreign language testimony, writings, and recordings have ev-
identiary value, multilingual jurors who understand that evidence without the 
aid of a translator or interpreter are often forced to “ignore” the foreign lan-
guage primary evidence.93 The jury instructions for several federal circuits 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Llinas, 603 F.2d at 509–10. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing a court’s 
response to a conflict between an interpreter and a multilingual juror); infra notes 101–109 and 
accompanying text (discussing that same conflict). 
 89 See infra notes 93–117 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 93–100 and accompanying text. 
 91 See infra notes 101–109 and accompanying text. 
 92 See infra notes 110–117 and accompanying text. 
 93 Compare Perez, 658 F.2d at 662–63 (observing that Spanish speakers can understand testi-
mony given in Spanish and should be allowed to point out discrepancies in interpretations), with 
PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 3.18 (1998) (disal-
lowing multilingual jurors from considering foreign language evidence directly). Other circuits have 
jury instructions similar to those in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See MANUAL 
OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
§ 2.06B (2013 rev. ed.); MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT 
COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 1.12 (2010 ed.); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CIVIL PATTERN JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS § 1.3 (2013). It is unrealistic to believe that a multilingual juror could simply ignore 
original foreign language evidence that they can understand. See Perea, supra note 51, at 29 n.132 
(explaining that if courts expect multilingual jurors to “ignore entirely the [foreign]-language testi-
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require that multilingual jurors disregard information they garnered from for-
eign language evidence by virtue of their ability to speak a language other 
than English.94 Thus, there is tension between multilingual jurors’ duty to 
fairly consider the primary evidence before them and their duty to ignore 
what they understand the foreign language to mean.95 
In Hernandez, both the plurality and the dissent recognized this tension 
and proposed the Hernandez accommodation, which provides that multilin-
gual jurors should be impanelled and allowed to direct questions to the court 
when they detect discrepancies in a translation or interpretation.96 This ac-
commodation is not generally reflected in the jury instructions in a number of 
the federal circuits.97 
At least two states with large language minority98 populations, Florida 
and California, have integrated an accommodation like the one proposed in 
                                                                                                                           
mony and hear and understand only the English-language interpretation, then substantial linguistic 
evidence suggests that compliance with [such a] request would be impossible”); Farida Ali, Note, 
Multilingual Prospective Jurors: Assessing California Standards Twenty Years After Hernandez v. 
New York, 8 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 236, 270 (2013) (describing the mandate to ignore foreign 
language evidence as a mere “procedural goal” rather than a “reflection of reality”).  
 94 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (detailing jury instructions for federal circuit 
courts). The following model criminal jury instructions for the Ninth Circuit are an example of the 
types of jury instructions in a number of federal jurisdictions: 
 [A language] [Languages] other than English will be used for some evidence 
during this trial. [When a witness testifies in another language, the witness will do 
so through an official court interpreter.] [When recorded evidence is presented in 
another language, there will be an official court translation of the recording.] 
 
 The evidence you are to consider and on which you must base your decision is 
only the English-language [interpretation] [translation] provided through the official 
court [interpreters] [translators]. Although some of you may know the non-English 
language used, you must disregard any meaning of the non-English words that dif-
fers from the official [interpretation] [translation]. 
 
 [You must not make any assumptions about a witness or a party based solely up-
on the use of an interpreter to assist that witness or party.] 
MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT, supra note 93, § 1.12 (alterations in original). 
 95 See Perea, supra note 51, at 29 n.132 (claiming that it is “impossible” for multilingual ju-
rors to ignore what they hear in a foreign language that they can understand); Ali, supra note 93, 
at 270 (noting that it is not a “reflection of reality” to ask multilingual jurors to ignore what they 
hear in a language they can understand); supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing how it 
is unrealistic to expect multilingual jurors to ignore testimony in their native language and that 
such a request may not be possible for them to comply with). 
 96 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364 (plurality opinion); id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (discussing the Hernandez accommodation). 
 97 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (citing examples of model jury instructions). 
 98 See 52 U.S.C.A. § 10503(e) (West 2014) (defining “language minorities”). This Note uses 
the term “language minorities” to refer to persons who speak a language other than English where 
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Hernandez directly into their state pattern jury instructions concerning for-
eign language evidence.99 In those states, multilingual jurors must still defer 
to the English-language interpretations or translations provided by the court, 
but the jurors can direct concerns to the judge if they detect a discrepancy 
between the original, foreign-language evidence and the English-language 
version presented by a court interpreter or translator.100 
2. United States v. Perez, the Inspiration for the Hernandez Accommodation 
The case that likely inspired the Hernandez accommodation is United 
States v. Perez, a 1981 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, which held that a trial judge did not engage in an abuse of discretion 
when he dismissed a multilingual juror from the trial after the juror argued 
                                                                                                                           
that language is associated with their ethnicity or national origin. See id. Although the term “lan-
guage minorities” is used in voting rights law, its usage in that context may be narrower than in 
this Note. See id. For example, federal elections law grants certain language-specific accommoda-
tions to “language minorities,” but defines the term to include “persons who are American Indian, 
Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or of Spanish heritage.” Id. Unlike this Note, under United States 
voting rights law, the definition of “language minorities” includes only those persons from language 
groups that “have been effectively excluded from participation in the electoral process” and may 
require access to bilingual election materials for full participation in elections. See § 10503(a)–(e). 
 99 See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Duty to Abide by 
Translation Provided in Court § 108 (2013); FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES, Jury to Be Guided by Official English Translation/Interpretation: Preliminary In-
structions § 2.8–.12 (2013). The text of an exemplary Florida jury instruction follows: 
 [Language used] may be used during this trial. 
 
 The evidence you are to consider is only that provided through the official court 
[interpreters] [translators]. Although some of you may know [language used], it is 
important that all jurors consider the same evidence. Therefore, you must accept the 
English [interpretation] [translation]. You must disregard any different meaning. 
 
 If, however, during the testimony there is a question as to the accuracy of the 
English interpretation, you should bring this matter to my attention immediately by 
raising your hand. You should not ask your question or make any comment about 
the interpretation in the presence of the other jurors, or otherwise share your ques-
tion or concern with any of them. I will take steps to see if your question can be an-
swered and any discrepancy resolved. If, however, after such efforts a discrepancy 
remains, I emphasize that you must rely only upon the official English interpretation 
as provided by the court interpreter and disregard any other contrary interpretation. 
FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra § 2.8. 
 100 See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 99, § 108 
(“If you believe the court interpreter [interpreted] testimony incorrectly, let me know immediately 
by writing a note . . . .”); FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra 
note 99, §§ 2.8–.12 (“If . . . during the testimony there is a question as to the accuracy of the Eng-
lish interpretation, you should bring this matter to my attention immediately by raising your 
hand.”). 
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with an interpreter.101 Initially the juror, hearing what she thought was an er-
ror in interpretation, spoke out in the courtroom without prompting from the 
judge.102 Part of the exchange between the interpreter and the juror went un-
heard by the judge at the time, but at the end of the exchange the juror either 
called the interpreter “an idiot” (as the court reporter recorded) or said the 
dispute was over “an idiom” (as the juror later told the judge in chambers).103 
Only later would the judge become aware of the latter part of the exchange 
and dismiss the juror out of fear that the juror may have become too biased 
against one of the parties or the court proceedings to continue serving.104 
The trial judge in Perez dismissed the juror because of the juror’s de-
meanor both during and after the outburst, not because the juror had a con-
cern over the interpretation.105 In fact, the judge responded immediately to 
the juror’s initial concerns by developing an impromptu system whereby 
questions would be directed to the judge by the juror after the witness had 
completed testifying, after which the judge would instruct the prosecutor to 
relay questions to the witness for clarification.106 
According to records available to the Ninth Circuit on review, this pro-
cess went smoothly.107 In developing this method, the trial judge openly 
acknowledged that Spanish-speaking jurors would actively listen to and un-
derstand the Spanish-language evidence presented in the case and may have 
concerns about some of the interpretation.108 The trial judge developed this 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 n.3, 364 (plurality opinion) (proposing the Hernandez 
accommodation despite characterizing the juror’s interruption in Perez as “illustrat[ing] the sort of 
problems that may arise where a juror fails to accept the official translation of foreign-language 
testimony”); id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing approvingly the trial judge’s instruction in 
Perez that jurors with questions about interpretations should direct them to the court’s attention 
only after the witness is done testifying); Perez, 658 F.2d at 662–63 (discussing the dismissal of a 
juror who disagreed with the interpretation). For a critique of Justice Kennedy’s appraisal that 
multilingual jurors can be a source of “problems” and a defense of the important role of multilin-
gual jurors, see Perea, supra note 51, at 37–40. 
 102 Perez, 658 F.2d at 662. 
 103 Id. at 662–63. 
 104 Id. at 663. 
 105 See id. at 662–63. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See id. at 663 (noting that after the court understood the multilingual juror’s concerns, the 
prosecutor asked the witness for clarification, and the “examination proceeded thereafter without 
incident”). 
 108 See id. at 662–63. The trial judge in Perez addressed Mrs. Kim, the multilingual juror in 
question, along with the other jurors as follows: 
 Just a moment. The Court recognizes that some of the jurors may be able to un-
derstand Spanish, and your own ears will tell you what you hear. This witness is tes-
tifying through an interpreter, but if those of you who can in fact understand Spanish 
hear certain words differently that [sic] you understand the interpreter to relate them, 
then you may, when the witness is finished with his testimony, you may place your 
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procedure to answer the multilingual juror’s concerns while maintaining or-
der in the courtroom and preventing jurors from interacting in an uncontrolled 
fashion with the interpreter or the witness.109 
3. Allowing All Jurors to Ask Questions During Trial 
Although the Hernandez accommodation focuses on allowing multilin-
gual jurors to ask questions during trial, attempts have been made in some 
federal courts to allow all jurors to ask questions during trial.110 One tech-
nique for managing juror questions was implemented in a recent case in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.111 The trial judge’s tech-
nique required jurors to each pass in a question form, with or without ques-
tions on it, to preserve juror anonymity.112 The judge and attorneys involved 
in the case reviewed the questions while the jurors took a short break.113 The 
judge selected, with advice from the attorneys, which questions he would 
ask.114 The attorneys then had the opportunity to use those questions as lead-
                                                                                                                           
question, you may raise the question that you have with the Court. If the Court feels 
that it is a question that can be properly answered, then the Court will take care of 
attempting to get it answered. But we are obviously going to break down if individ-
ual jurors want to ask questions of the interpreter or of the witness directly. The rea-
son for that is, some of those questions may be what the law declares to be incompe-
tent. That would result in prejudicial error either to the defendant or to the govern-
ment. 
 
 Now, let’s start over again. Mrs. Kim, tell me what question you have about your 
understanding of an answer, and we’ll place the question again to the witness. 
Id. 
 109 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the judge’s admonition that the trial 
could “break down” if the juror directly interacts with a witness or interpreter). 
 110 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364 (plurality opinion) (discussing the Hernandez accommoda-
tion); id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); Stephen D. Susman & Thomas M. Melsheimer, Trial 
by Agreement: How Trial Lawyers Hold the Key to Improving Jury Trials in Civil Cases, 32 REV. 
LITIG. 431, 452–55 (2013) (discussing the juror questions approach employed in CEATS, Inc. v. 
Cont’l Airlines, No. 6:10cv120 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2012)); Alison K. Bennett, Eastern District of 
Texas Experiments with Jurors’ Questions During Trial, BATTLE BLAWG (Mar. 22, 2012), http://
thebattleblawg.com/2012/03/22/eastern-district-of-texas-experiments-with-jurors-questions-during-
trial/, archived at http://perma.cc/LFA8-PWQU (discussing the CEATS case where all jurors were 
invited to ask questions); supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (discussing the Hernandez ac-
commodation); infra notes at 111–117 and accompanying text (discussing the Eastern District of 
Texas approach in further detail). See generally Laurie Forbes Neff, Comment, The Propriety of Jury 
Questioning: A Remedy for Perceived Harmless Error, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 437 (2001) (providing a 
survey of the history of federal and state court practices regarding jurors asking questions at trial). 
 111 See Bennett, supra note 110 (discussing CEATS). This Note refers to this technique as the 
“Eastern District of Texas approach.” See infra notes 112–225 and accompanying text. 
 112 Bennett, supra note 110. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
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ins for additional questions, which they elected to do around one-third of the 
time.115 The total process added about fifteen minutes per witness to the 
length of the trial.116 All eleven of the attorneys involved in the trial were 
polled about their satisfaction with the system before the verdict was handed 
down, and each attorney strongly supported the system.117 
II. FOR-CAUSE CHALLENGES TO JURORS WITH SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE: 
WHY FOREIGN PHONEMES ARE FEARED MORE THAN PHYSICS 
As is inevitably the case with jury pools, some prospective jurors may 
arrive with a specialized skill set or knowledge germane to weighing or inter-
preting some of the evidence that will be presented at trial.118 This Part ana-
lyzes whether jurors with different types of expertise can be struck for cause 
during voir dire.119 Section A examines a Fourth Circuit opinion which ruled 
that multilingual jurors can be struck for having doubts about whether they 
will bring their linguistic expertise into play in considering original foreign 
language evidence.120 Section B then compares this treatment with jurors 
who have expertise in other contexts and their immunity to for-cause strikes 
on the basis of that expertise.121 
A. For-Cause Strikes Against Jurors with Expertise  
in Foreign Languages 
In 2011, in United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit held that multilingual prospective jurors who showed 
any unwillingness to adopt the foreign language interpretations of a court in-
terpreter could be excused by means of a for-cause challenge during voir 
dire.122 During voir dire, the district court struck three prospective jurors on 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See, e.g., United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 748, 750 (4th Cir. 2011) (con-
sidering a case where several prospective jurors understood Spanish and were challenged for 
cause during voir dire in a trial where Spanish-language evidence was to be presented), cert. de-
nied, 132 S. Ct. 1935 (2012); Hard v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 870 F.2d 1454, 1462 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(examining a case where a juror possessed the skills necessary to interpret an X-ray that had been 
admitted into evidence); State v. Mann, 39 P.3d 124, 132, 135 (N.M. 2002) (examining a case 
where a juror with expertise in physics used evidence presented at trial by an expert witness to 
calculate the probability that an alleged accident was actually a murder). 
 119 See infra notes 122–169 and accompanying text. 
 120 See infra notes 122–140 and accompanying text. 
 121 See infra notes 141–169 and accompanying text. 
 122 See 660 F.3d at 748, 750. 
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its own motion.123 The dismissed jurors all had some ability to understand 
Spanish and, when presented with a hypothetical question about language use 
during voir dire, all had expressed some hesitancy at accepting a Spanish-to-
English interpretation by a court interpreter if they thought it was in error.124 
The district court made this decision to strike them even though it was not 
certain that any interpreters or translators would be used during trial.125 The 
court feared that even if interpreters or translators were used, a multilingual 
juror could be a “shadow translator in the jury box.”126 The defendant object-
ed, noting that the strikes would remove all Latino prospective jurors from 
the venire only because they had the ability to speak Spanish.127 The defend-
ant lost on the objections and appealed, in part, on the basis of these 
strikes.128 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See id. at 748. 
 124 Id. at 747–48. The trial judge had asked which prospective jurors were “fluent in the Span-
ish language.” Id. at 747. The relevant portion of the voir dire interviews with the resulting three 
multilingual prospective jurors who were dismissed for cause is reproduced below: 
THE COURT: If you were chosen to be a juror in this case and you disagreed with 
the interpretation or translation by the interpreters, could you base your decision on 
what the translator—all of these translators are court certified. Would you have any 
problem in basing your decision on what the translators have done? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR # 1: Well, Your Honor, I’m certain if I disagreed with the 
translator, it would have to be a matter that I would bring up either to the Court or to 
fellow jurors. I’ve also testified in civil court in a foreign country in a foreign lan-
guage, Portuguese in this case, and I know the differences between translation and 
what was actually said in the court, so it’s a matter of some sensitivity to me. 
. . . 
THE COURT: [I]f you were to believe that the translators were not accurately trans-
lating what the witness might be saying, would you be able to base your decision on 
what the translator has said, or would you have problems with that? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR # 2: It would depend on, you know, what was said. If, you 
know, the difference. I couldn’t give you a specific yes-or-no answer. 
. . . 
THE COURT: All right. You’ve heard my question to the other two potential jurors. 
Would you have difficulty if you felt that there was a translation that you didn’t 
agree with? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR # 3: Yes. 
Id. at 748 (alterations in original). 
 125 Id. at 747–48. 
 126 Id. at 748. 
 127 See Brief of Appellant at 11–12, Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742 (No. 10-4084), 2010 WL 
2210944, at *11–12. 
 128 See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 748. The defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cabrera-Beltran, 132 S. Ct. 1935 
(2012) (No. 11-1099). The writ was denied without an opinion. Cabrera-Beltran, 132 S. Ct. at 
1935 (2012) (denying certiorari). 
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To determine whether the district court’s for-cause strikes were constitu-
tional, the Fourth Circuit looked to the plurality opinion and the dissents in 
the 1991 U.S. Supreme Court decision Hernandez v. New York.129 Having 
determined that seven of the nine justices in Hernandez would have support-
ed a for-cause challenge to a juror unwilling to accept the interpretation of a 
court interpreter, the Fourth Circuit held that the trial court’s for-cause strikes 
of the prospective jurors did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.130 
The defendant in Cabrera-Beltran also argued that striking the three 
prospective jurors violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial 
jury.131 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that jurors are not 
entitled to substitute their own interpretations of foreign language evidence 
instead of relying on a court interpreter’s interpretation.132 The court rea-
soned that allowing multilingual jurors to rely on their own interpretations of 
foreign language evidence would result in the multilingual jurors considering 
different evidence than the evidence that monolingual English speakers could 
consider.133 
In reaching this holding, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the district 
court could have employed the Hernandez accommodation, but ruled that it 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 748–49. See generally Hernandez v. New York, 500 
U.S. 352, 362–63 (1991) (plurality opinion) (noting that a juror who could not accept the official 
English interpretation of foreign language evidence could be dismissed for cause); id. at 379 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (same). 
 130 See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 749. But see Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364 (plurality opin-
ion) (suggesting the Hernandez accommodation—which lets jurors raise their concerns about 
interpretation or translation errors to the court rather than striking the jurors for cause during voir 
dire—and opining that the decision of the prosecutor to strike a multilingual juror rather than 
abide by a requested accommodation could be evidence of intentional discrimination); id. at 379 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (supporting the Hernandez accommodation); Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 
at 750 n.6 (recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court had proposed the Hernandez accommodation 
and further recognizing that the multilingual prospective jurors in Cabrera-Beltran could have 
been offered the Hernandez accommodation, even though the Fourth Circuit refused to require 
such an accommodation). 
 131 See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 749. The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
provides in relevant part that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit in Cabrera-
Beltran opined that a juror is only impartial if they can “render a verdict based on the evidence 
presented in court . . . .” See 660 F.3d at 740 (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n.12 
(1984)). The court then effectively concluded that foreign language evidence is not “evidence 
presented in court” and ruled that the multilingual jurors could be struck for cause because they 
were unwilling to ignore such evidence. See id. at 749–50. 
 132 See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 749. 
 133 See id. 
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did not abuse its discretion in failing to do so.134 The Fourth Circuit’s analysis 
on this point was limited, merely noting that Hernandez was not in conflict 
with the court’s holding in Cabrera-Beltran.135 
Notably, the three prospective jurors who were dismissed each ex-
pressed different levels of hesitancy toward the judge’s questions.136 Prospec-
tive Juror Number One merely requested a variant of the Hernandez accom-
modation by saying that they would want to inform someone, the court or the 
other jurors, about any noted discrepancy.137 Prospective Juror Number Two 
seemed uncertain how to respond, claimed that it might depend on the situa-
tion, and implied that the nature or type of differences in the interpretation 
could affect that juror’s willingness to abide by a separate interpretation.138 
Prospective Juror Number Three agreed that they would “have difficulty” 
abiding by an interpretation that differed from their own understanding of the 
original Spanish-language evidence.139 The Fourth Circuit, however, did not 
distinguish between these types of juror responses when determining eligibil-
ity to be struck for cause by the district court on its own motion.140 
B. For-Cause Strikes Are Generally Not Allowed Against Jurors with  
Non-Language-Based Expertise 
Multilingual jurors are not the only jurors who can have some type of 
specialized skill related to understanding and weighing evidence.141 Jurors 
may have a skill set that allows them to form opinions about complex evi-
                                                                                                                           
 134 See id. at 750 & n.6. 
 135 See id. It is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit came to this conclusion because it viewed 
the Hernandez accommodation as non-binding dicta, or whether it prioritized the view from Her-
nandez that an unwillingness to abide by an official court interpretation was grounds for a for-
cause challenge, or both. See id. 
 136 See id. at 748; supra note 124 and accompanying text (providing the relevant portion of 
the responses of the multilingual prospective jurors during voir dire). 
 137 See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 748. The Fourth Circuit seems to have recognized the 
juror’s comments as a request for a Hernandez accommodation, or at the very least realized that 
such an accommodation was possible. See id. at 750 & n.6 (acknowledging that some previous 
cases had suggested that multilingual jurors could be allowed to address the court with their con-
cerns about potentially flawed interpretations). 
 138 See id. at 748. 
 139 See id. 
 140 See id. at 748–50 & n.6 (refusing to require the Hernandez accommodation for any of the 
prospective jurors while acknowledging that the trial court could have granted such an accommo-
dation). 
 141 See Paul F. Kirgis, The Problem of the Expert Juror, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 493, 524–25 
(2002) (providing examples of jurors with specialized skill sets that were applicable to analyzing 
trial evidence). See generally Michael B. Mushlin, Bound and Gagged: The Peculiar Predicament 
of Professional Jurors, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239 (2007) (discussing how the United States 
legal system interacts with jurors with specialized abilities to examine material evidence). 
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dence or to assess the credibility of expert testimony in a way that other jurors 
simply cannot.142 These jurors with specialized knowledge germane to inter-
preting certain evidence in a case are sometimes called “professional jurors,” 
because they often possess this knowledge by virtue of their area of employ-
ment.143 This Note, however, refers to jurors with such specialized knowledge 
as “expert jurors.”144 Although expert jurors may be subject to a peremptory 
challenge like other jurors, they are not generally subject to challenges for 
cause on account of their expertise, so long as they can remain impartial.145 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Mushlin, supra note 141, at 240–41 & n.9 (discussing the phenomenon generally of jurors 
with professional-level expertise); see Hard, 870 F.2d at 1462 (examining a case where a juror 
possessed the skills necessary to interpret an X-ray that had been admitted into evidence); Mann, 
39 P.3d at 132, 135 (examining a case where a juror with expertise in physics used evidence pre-
sented at trial by an expert witness to calculate the probability that an alleged accident was actual-
ly a murder). 
 143 See Mushlin, supra note 141, at 241 & n.9. 
 144 See Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216, 1224 (10th Cir. 2005) (describing a 
juror as an “‘expert’ juror” with special knowledge regarding dog training even though it was 
primarily the juror’s family members, rather than the juror herself, who were engaged in dog train-
ing). One commentator has argued that the term “expert juror” should be used to refer to jurors 
who may possess the same types of knowledge as expert witnesses would at trial. See Kirgis, su-
pra note 141, at 496, 526–28; see also Mushlin, supra note 141, at 241 n.9 (commenting on the 
use of the term “expert juror”). Another commentator has argued that the term “professional juror” 
is broader, because it encompasses jurors who would not be categorized as expert witnesses if 
testifying, but who nevertheless have skill by virtue of their chosen professions. See Mushlin, 
supra note 141, at 241 n.9. This Note adopts the term “expert jurors” more broadly than either of 
these usages, to mean jurors who have heightened skills material to the interpretation of the trial 
evidence in a given case, whether or not the skills arise from the jurors’ professions or whether 
they are sufficiently skilled so as to be categorized as an expert witness. See Marquez, 399 F.3d at 
1224. This usage refers to such jurors regardless of how common their skill set is. See infra notes 
160, 188–193 and accompanying text (arguing that multilingualism is a common skill, and even 
were it otherwise, the majority rule allows jurors to exercise their skills at considering evidence 
openly in the jury room).  
 145 See, e.g., Blank v. Hubbuch, 633 N.E.2d 439, 442 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (upholding a trial 
court’s decision not to strike a doctor for cause from serving as a juror in a medical malpractice 
case); Mann, 39 P.3d at 132, 135 (opining that substantial educational or professional experience 
alone are not grounds to assume that a prospective juror should be struck for bias); People v. Ar-
nold, 753 N.E.2d 846, 851, 854 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that “specialized knowledge” or background 
alone are not grounds for “automatic exemptions from [jury] service” unless the knowledge is 
shared with other jurors); see also Kirgis, supra note 141, at 524–26 & n.217; Mushlin, supra note 
141, at 257 & nn.90–91. Two commentators have, however, proposed expanding for-cause chal-
lenges to exclude jurors with expertise related to some material evidence in a case. See Kirgis, 
supra note 141, at 535 (“[J]udges can and should also play a role [during voir dire] by granting 
challenges for cause in cases where a juror’s expertise clearly encroaches upon material issues in 
the case.”); Mushlin, supra note 141, at 272–77 (proposing that courts should allow for-cause 
challenges to jurors with professional-level expertise in a subject that is important in the case). 
Expert jurors would still be subject to for-cause challenges if they were otherwise ineligible for 
jury duty or had some express or implied bias toward the case. See O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 
24, § 4:8 (noting that for-cause challenges occur where a juror is legally ineligible for service or 
where the juror shows signs of some “actual or implied bias”); Kirgis, supra note 141, at 525–26 
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The case law surrounding expert jurors typically focuses on appellate 
challenges to the presence of an expert on the jury when information comes 
to light that the expert juror used his expertise to interpret evidence during 
jury deliberations.146 Jurisdictions generally do not regulate whether expert 
jurors can use their knowledge for their own internal deliberations because 
what a particular juror is thinking during deliberations is rarely known.147 
Instead, the case law focuses on whether an expert juror can share his or her 
interpretations of the evidence with the rest of the jurors during delibera-
tions.148 The question that arises out of this sharing during deliberations is 
whether an expert juror will inject extraneous prejudicial information into the 
case.149 
Typically, courts allow experts to sit on juries, but jurisdictions are split 
as to whether expert jurors may share their specialized knowledge during de-
liberations.150 For example, in 2002, in State v. Mann, the New Mexico Su-
preme Court held than an expert on the jury was allowed to share his analysis 
of data presented at trial with other jurors during deliberations.151 Mann was 
                                                                                                                           
(noting that jurors can be challenged for cause for “fail[ure] to meet the statutory qualifications for 
service” or for “actual bias”). 
 146 See infra notes 150–163 and accompanying text (explaining the majority and minority rules 
on expert jurors); see also Hard, 870 F.2d at 1462 (examining a case where a juror possessed the 
skills necessary to interpret an X-ray that had been admitted into evidence); Mann, 39 P.3d at 132, 
135 (examining a case where a juror with knowledge about physics used evidence presented at trial 
by an expert witness to calculate the probability that an alleged accident was actually a murder). 
 147 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b); see also Kirgis, supra note 141, at 493 & n.5 (noting an excep-
tion to the general rule for deliberations infected with “extraneous prejudicial information”); infra 
notes 159–163 and accompanying text (noting that, even in a minority rule jurisdiction, expert 
jurors may consider the trial evidence using their full skill set during jury deliberations although 
they cannot share their expert knowledge with other jurors). In federal court, there are tight limits 
on the types of information related to the inner workings of jury deliberations that can be intro-
duced to overturn a jury verdict. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b). One exception to this is that a juror 
may testify about what transpired during jury deliberations when the jury verdict was based on 
“extraneous prejudicial information [that] was improperly brought to the jury’s attention.” See id. 
Evidence is said to be “extraneous” or “extrinsic” when it was never “legitimately [brought] be-
fore the court.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 675, 705. Outside of certain statu-
tory exceptions, such as for extraneous prejudicial information, jurors are not allowed to testify 
about their own or another jurors’ “mental processes” that occurred during jury deliberations and 
voting. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b). For additional commentary on these principles as applied to 
multilingual jurors, see Perea, supra note 51, at 40–43. 
 148 See Mushlin, supra note 141, at 258–65. 
 149 See Mann, 39 P.3d at 129–32, 136 (holding that juror expertise shared during jury deliber-
ations is not extraneous prejudicial information); see also supra note 147 and accompanying text 
(discussing the definition of “extraneous prejudicial information”). 
 150 Mushlin, supra note 141, at 258. Compare Mann, 39 P.3d at 132, 136 (holding that the 
sharing of juror expertise during deliberations is not juror misconduct), with People v. Maragh, 
729 N.E.2d 701, 704–06 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that the sharing of juror expertise during delibera-
tions is juror misconduct). 
 151 See Mann, 39 P.3d at 127, 136. 
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a criminal case that involved a boy who died after being impaled with a 
screwdriver.152 An expert witness presented evidence about the likelihood of 
a child accidentally dying by falling and impaling himself on a screwdriver, 
and suggested that there was a possibility that the boy may not have been 
murdered.153 One juror was an engineer and performed a probability calcula-
tion based on the expert witness’ data to determine the likelihood that the 
death was an accident.154 The juror concluded that the odds of such a death 
occurring accidentally as detailed by the expert witness were astronomically 
low.155 After sharing his calculations in jury deliberations, the jury convicted 
the defendant.156 The case was appealed on the grounds that the jury had con-
sidered extraneous prejudicial information, but the court held that the juror 
had merely interpreted evidence that had actually been presented at trial.157 
Mann represents the majority rule on expert jurors, which is also followed by 
at least two federal circuits.158 
In contrast, in 2000, in People v. Maragh, the Court of Appeals of New 
York came to a different conclusion, holding that expert jurors could not 
communicate information related to their expertise during jury deliberations 
about any “material issue in the case.”159 Accordingly, in New York, it is now 
juror misconduct for an expert juror—someone with specialized knowledge 
beyond the “common ken” of jurors—to share that expertise with other jurors 
during deliberations if the information is material to the case.160 Sharing such 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See id. at 125, 127. 
 153 See id. at 126–27. 
 154 See id. at 127. 
 155 See id. at 128 (“I simply multiplied the numbers, one over 10 times one over two times 1 
over 100 three times, and the number you get is basically five times ten to minus 8 or in what most 
of us think about, one in a 20 million chance.”). 
 156 See id. at 127. 
 157 See id. at 129, 134, 136; supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing the definition 
of “extraneous prejudicial information”). 
 158 See Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 1052, 1065 (Colo. 2011) (noting that Mann represents 
the majority rule on expert jurors as of 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Bedor v. Johnson, 
292 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2013); see also United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 
2008) (noting that jurors may not introduce “specific extra-record facts relating to the defendant,” 
but they may introduce matters related to “the jurors’ personal experience”); Marquez, 399 F.3d at 
1223 (holding that a juror’s discussion of her knowledge of police dog training during delibera-
tions was not “extraneous prejudicial information”); Hard, 870 F.2d at 1462 (holding that a juror’s 
knowledge of how to interpret an X-ray entered into evidence was not extraneous prejudicial in-
formation). 
 159 See Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 704–05. Maragh was a homicide case where two nurse-jurors 
shared information with other jurors about the possible medical effects of the victim’s blood loss 
that might have resulted in death, which potentially affected the verdict. See id. at 702–06. 
 160 See id. at 704–05 (suggesting that juror expertise is the ability to “conduct[] personal spe-
cialized assessments not within the common ken of juror experience and knowledge”). Although 
Maragh did not provide a more explicit interpretation of the “common ken” standard, New York 
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information may provide grounds for reversal upon appeal.161 Even in New 
York, however, jurors cannot be struck for cause during voir dire solely be-
cause they possess expertise that could be used to personally consider evi-
dence.162 Maragh represents the minority rule on expert jurors.163 
A major concern over an expert juror sharing his or her expertise during 
deliberations is that the expert juror will be instantly promoted to the status of 
an alpha juror,164 thereby controlling the outcome of the deliberations.165 The 
rule articulated in Maragh, allowing expert jurors to be impanelled but disal-
lowing them from sharing material information garnered from their areas of 
their expertise, is intended to keep them from becoming alpha jurors.166 This 
                                                                                                                           
modified its criminal jury instructions to take the Maragh standard into account, providing possi-
ble insight into the standard. See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., Juror Expertise, in CRIMINAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2D (2003) [hereinafter Juror Expertise], available at http://www.nycourts.
gov/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Juror_Expertise.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GHT7-TA5T. In New 
York, during criminal jury deliberations, a juror may only share the type of “knowledge and expe-
rience that an average person would acquire in life” and not “special expertise,” which is “some-
thing more than ordinary knowledge or experience in a certain area.” Id. Maragh represents the 
minority rule. Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1064. This Note argues that multilingualism is so common 
relative to other forms of juror expertise that it is unclear that it is even beyond the “common ken” 
of the average juror. See infra notes 188–193 and accompanying text. This Note defines the term 
“expert juror” more broadly as someone who has heightened skills material to the interpretation of 
the trial evidence in a given case, regardless of the relative commonality of those skills. See supra 
notes 143–144 and accompanying text. 
 161 See Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 702, 706. 
 162 See id. at 704–05. 
 163 Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1064 (noting that Maragh is the minority opinion as of 2011). The 
Supreme Court of Nevada has supported the minority position as well. See State v. Thacker, 596 
P.2d 508, 509 (Nev. 1979) (affirming an order granting a new trial when a cattleman juror intro-
duced facts about cattle into deliberations that were not in evidence at trial). 
 164 See THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 45 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate 
eds., 2001) (defining alpha as “(of animals in a group) the socially dominant individual”). An 
“alpha juror” is one who leads the rest of the jurors and is someone who all other jurors look up to 
or become subservient to by virtue of the expert juror’s subject matter authority. See id.; see also 
Muslin, supra note 141, at 270 (noting how jurors with expertise in particular professions may 
come to control jury deliberations by virtue of an “air of authority” granted by their subject matter 
expertise). One commentator has observed that a juror is most likely to become an alpha juror due 
to one or all of the following factors: having a strong personality, coming from a respected profes-
sion, and having a higher level of educational attainment. See Hsieh, supra note 73, at 1197. 
 165 See Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 704 (suggesting that other jurors will tend to defer to an expert 
juror); Mushlin, supra note 141, at 270 (sharing one jury consultant’s view that an expert juror’s 
“expertise itself would lend the professional juror an air of authority that could prove decisive in 
deliberations”). See generally Ted A. Donner & Melissa M. Piwowar, Avoiding a Jury of One: 
Challenging Expert Jurors by Focusing Voir Dire on Their Ability to Deliberate and Follow the 
Law, in 2 BLUE’S GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION, App. G-6 (Lisa Blue & Robert B. Hirschhorn eds., 
2004) (arguing that lawyers should try to identify expert jurors during voir dire and question them 
about “any preconceptions” that derive from their area of expertise to avoid having one juror dom-
inate the jury as a subject matter authority). 
 166 See Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 704–06. 
2015] Multilingual Perspective Jurors and For-Cause Strikes 1275 
approach could be problematic because it might prevent expert jurors from 
fully engaging in deliberations.167 Alternately, it could allow expert jurors to 
share their opinions, but force them to hide the rationale behind those opin-
ions.168 This could potentially still lead other jurors to credit them as experts 
with “inside knowledge,” but disallow the experts’ rationales from being 
thoughtfully considered and debated by all jurors.169 
III. METHODS FOR ACCOMMODATING AND IMPANELLING MULTILINGUAL 
JURORS: CHANGING A LEGAL SYSTEM THAT FEARS OR  
DISTRUSTS MULTILINGUAL JURORS 
In a diverse, modern American courtroom, using for-cause strikes to ex-
clude multilingual jurors from service in trials of their peers is both unac-
ceptable and unnecessary.170 This Part argues that courts should accommo-
date the particular expertise of multilingual jurors and proposes methods for 
doing so.171 Section A asserts that fear of multilingual jurors may motivate 
some courts to refuse those jurors accommodations, and that multilingual ju-
rors, like other expert jurors, should not be excused for cause during voir 
dire.172 Section B reviews the Hernandez accommodation standard outlined 
in the 1991 U.S. Supreme Court decision Hernandez v. New York, and sug-
gests that the Fourth Circuit unjustly refused to require a requested Hernan-
dez accommodation for prospective jurors.173 Finally, Section C argues that 
when appropriately combined, the rules for expert jurors and the Hernandez 
accommodation are the appropriate ways to impanel multilingual jurors and 
guarantee fairer trials involving foreign language evidence.174 
                                                                                                                           
 167 Mushlin, supra note 141, at 271. One commentator describes the effects of the Maragh 
rule as being “bound and gagged” because expert jurors are still bound to serve on juries, but they 
are “gagged” because they cannot fully share their observations “openly or effectively” about 
material evidence the way that non-expert jurors could. See id. This commentator notes that being 
“gagged” is directly at odds with a juror’s responsibility to deliberate about the evidence, conclud-
ing that “the Maragh instruction may be impossible to follow.” Id. at 278.  
 168 Id. at 279–80. 
 169 Id. at 279–81. 
 170 See infra notes 175–225 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 175–225 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 175–202 and accompanying text. 
 173 See infra notes 203–209 and accompanying text. 
 174 See infra notes 210–225 and accompanying text. 
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A. Fear of Multilingual Jurors is a Possible Reason for Courts’ Reluctance to 
Adopt the Hernandez Accommodation 
When a multilingual juror is asked hypothetical questions during voir 
dire about possible foreign language evidence, there are five possible out-
comes if the Hernandez accommodation is the default rule of the jurisdic-
tion.175 First, the concern about foreign language evidence might be com-
pletely unwarranted if no interpreters or translators are used at trial.176 Sec-
ond, if an interpretation or translation is accurate, there may be no differences 
or only immaterial differences between the way that the multilingual juror 
perceives the foreign language evidence and the way the interpreter or trans-
lator rendered it into English.177 In this instance, no good reason exists to 
strike multilingual jurors for cause because no party would be prejudiced by 
letting multilingual jurors hear the same evidence in two different lan-
guages.178 Third, the interpreter or translator may make an egregious mistake 
or subtly bias the evidence by making a witness or evidentiary source seem 
more or less favorable in English than the evidence was in the foreign lan-
guage.179 In this case, if a multilingual juror can catch and fix the error 
through the intervention of the court, justice is best served.180 Fourth, the 
multilingual juror may perceive an error in interpretation or translation where 
none existed.181 If the juror brings this to the court’s attention, the witness or 
the original source material used in the translation may be re-examined to 
make sure that all jurors have an equal understanding of the evidence.182 The 
fifth possibility is similar to the fourth, except in this instance, a rogue multi-
lingual juror refuses to follow court instructions and then shares his or her 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See infra notes 176–183 and accompanying text (outlining possible outcomes when multi-
lingual jurors encounter foreign language evidence). 
 176 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 127, at 11–12 (claiming that because no interpreters 
were needed in United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, the voir dire questioning about language use 
was “baseless and unnecessary”). But see Brief of the United States at 13 n.4, United States v. 
Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1935 (2012) (No. 10-
4084), 2010 WL 2422266, at *13 n.4 (asserting that interpretation and stipulated translations were 
used at trial). 
 177 See Perea, supra note 51, at 21–22. 
 178 See id. 
 179 See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text (giving examples of such mistakes and 
biases). 
 180 See Perea, supra note 51, at 28 (noting that everyone should concern themselves over 
whether the interpretations in the courtroom are “accurate and faithful to the meaning of a wit-
ness’s testimony”). 
 181 See id. at 22; supra notes 101–104 and accompanying text (discussing a multilingual juror 
in Perez who incorrectly challenged a court interpreter). 
 182 See infra notes 200, 216–217 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts openly air the 
multilingual juror’s concerns as part of the adversarial process). 
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alternate perspective in the jury room during deliberations as a “shadow” 
translator or interpreter and introduces information that prejudices one of the 
parties.183 
Some courts assume that multilingual jurors who are unable to guarantee 
that they will unquestioningly abide by a court interpreter’s interpretation are 
rogue jurors in the fifth scenario.184 The blame is put on prospective jurors 
even when the Hernandez accommodation is requested and denied or ig-
nored.185 Indeed, the government sometimes assumes that the ability of jurors 
to speak other languages should alone be evidence of their “potential bias-
es.”186 Such antagonistic policies toward language minorities may be caused 
by fear and lack of understanding that some monolingual English-speakers 
have toward multilinguals.187 
If the ability to communicate in a foreign language is treated like other 
forms of juror expertise, then multilingual jurors should not be struck for 
cause.188 Even under the minority rule definition, if juror expertise represents 
some mastery of knowledge outside of the “common ken” of jurors, then ex-
pertise in another language is certainly common enough today.189 Consider 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 748 (discussing the trial judge’s concern that a multilin-
gual juror could be a “shadow translator in the jury box”). 
 184 See id. 
 185 See id. at 748, 750 & n.6 (writing that after the court failed to grant the requested Hernan-
dez accommodation, one multilingual juror was struck for his “inability to accept English transla-
tions” and two others were struck for this “inability” along with other factors). 
 186 See Brief of the United States, supra note 176, at 13 (“During jury selection, the district 
court questioned prospective jurors regarding, among other potential biases, their ability to speak 
and understand Spanish.” (emphasis added)). The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Batson 
v. Kentucky prohibited peremptory strikes justified by the notion that all members of a race are 
biased in a particular way. See 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). In defining the ability to speak Spanish as a 
type of “potential bias[],” the government seems to be engaging in the very type of stereotyping 
which Batson sought to guard against. See id. 
 187 See Perea, supra note 51, at 37 (discussing Hernandez and claiming that parts of the deci-
sion represent “a fear and misunderstanding” of multilingual jurors and worries that their presence 
will result in a “loss of control” by monolingual English-speakers in the courtroom); see also 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 356–58 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“Language elicits a 
response from others, ranging from admiration and respect, to distance and alienation, to ridicule 
and scorn.”); Hsieh, supra note 73, at 1196 n.46 (discussing the fear that some monolingual Eng-
lish-speakers have toward speakers of non-English languages, particularly in the courtroom). 
 188 See State v. Mann, 39 P.3d 124, 132 (N.M. 2002) (noting that juror expertise alone is not a 
sufficient basis for a for-cause challenge). 
 189 See People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701, 704 (N.Y. 2000) (discussing the minority rule 
“common ken” standard for expert jurors); supra note 160 and accompanying text (elaborating on 
New York’s interpretation of the minority rule “common ken” standard). Aside from special ex-
clusions from service such as having a lack of proficiency in English, as of 2012 there were ap-
proximately 220 million people in the United States who were potentially eligible for jury duty 
because they were eighteen or older and were U.S. citizens. Language Spoken at Home, supra 
note 3; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (2012) (listing qualifications for eligibility for jury duty). 
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that a doctor-juror can use their medical expertise on a medical malpractice 
case, yet multilingual jurors—who are likely more common—can be denied 
the ability to sit on some juries unless they ignore foreign-language evi-
dence.190 Because approximately one-in-seven people potentially eligible for 
jury duty speaks a language other than English at home, and more than one-
third of Americans are conversationally multilingual, if multilingualism is a 
form of expertise, it is so common that multilingual jurors should not be 
struck for cause.191 This is particularly likely to be true in ethnically concen-
trated court districts where a language minority criminal defendant may have 
multiple prospective jurors in the venire who are drawn from the same lan-
guage community.192 Spanish, in particular, is a commonly spoken language 
in the United States, and Spanish-speakers are involved in many cases involv-
ing foreign language evidence.193 
                                                                                                                           
 190 See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 750 & n.6 (upholding a decision to strike multilingual 
prospective jurors who could not or would not adhere solely to English-language interpretations); 
Blank v. Hubbuch, 633 N.E.2d 439, 442 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (upholding a trial court’s decision 
not to strike a doctor for cause from serving as a juror in a medical malpractice case). About 
14.5% of the jury-eligible population speaks a language other than English, while about 0.4% of 
the jury-eligible population is composed of professionally active physicians. See Language Spoken 
at Home, supra note 3 (citing the percentage of U.S. citizens aged eighteen or older who speak a 
language other than English at home); Total Professionally Active Physicians, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (last visited Apr. 13, 2015), http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-active-physicians/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/VJ5D-98DM (stating that there are 897,420 actively practicing physi-
cians in the United States). The figure of 14.5% of adults who are multilingual considers only 
those that use a foreign language well enough to speak it at home. Language Spoken at Home, 
supra note 3. More than one third of all Americans reported that they spoke a foreign language well 
enough to hold a conversation in it. Jeffrey M. Jones, Most in U.S. Say It’s Essential That Immigrants 
Learn English, GALLUP, Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/163895/say-essential-immigrants-
learn-english.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/K2UX-LN9R. The percentage of bilingual jurors 
cited in this Note may be somewhat overstated because the data cited do not separately list out the 
number of United States citizens who are monolingual in a language other than English. See Lan-
guage Spoken at Home, supra note 3. The number of practicing physicians eligible for jury duty is 
probably also somewhat overstated because the data does not state the number of doctors who are 
not United States citizens or who are otherwise ineligible for jury duty. See Total Professionally 
Active Physicians, supra. 
 191 See Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 705 (calling any expectation that jurors should abandon their 
abilities at the courtroom door “unrealistic”); supra notes 160, 190 and accompanying text (noting 
that multilingualism among jurors appears to be a relatively common skill, and even were it oth-
erwise, the majority rule on expert jurors applies regardless of the relative commonality of jurors’ 
skills). Note that the 14.5% of adult Americans who speak a non-English language at home is 
approximately equal to one seventh of the adult population of U.S. citizens. See supra note 190 
and accompanying text (discussing the percentage of the jury-eligible population that speaks a 
language other than English). 
 192 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 356–58 (plurality opinion) (noting that the complainants, the 
defendant, and the prosecution witnesses were all Latino or had Latino surnames, and that the 
multilingual venirepersons who were excused all spoke Spanish). 
 193 See Language Spoken at Home, supra note 3 (noting that 8.3% of United States citizens 
aged eighteen or older speak Spanish or Spanish creole at home, compared to 6.2% who spoke all 
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Regardless of how common multilingualism is, the majority rule is that 
an expert juror should still be allowed to share their interpretations of evi-
dence presented at trial, even if other jurors cannot understand the evidence 
with the same level of comprehension.194 For example, even if not all jurors 
understand how to interpret an X-ray presented as evidence at a trial, an ex-
pert juror who can read an X-ray may employ that skill in jury delibera-
tions.195 Such use of expertise that not all jurors share does not amount to 
juror misconduct.196 Because original foreign language evidence is the “real 
evidence” at the trial, once that evidence is part of a record, multilingual ju-
rors should be allowed to consider that evidence directly just like other expert 
jurors.197 
The question dividing the majority rule from the minority rule on expert 
jurors is merely whether the expert juror can share their interpretations during 
deliberations.198 Some courts fear that expert jurors will introduce extraneous 
prejudicial information into jury deliberations, information that has not been 
tested in the adversarial process.199 The Hernandez accommodation, howev-
er, will tend to avoid these issues altogether because a juror could address 
questions directly to the court and thereby subject their assessments of the 
evidence to the adversarial process.200 The law does not require expert jurors 
                                                                                                                           
other non-English languages at home); Jones, supra note 190 (noting that 60% of multilingual 
Americans speak Spanish as a second language); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363–64 (“It 
would be common knowledge in the locality that a significant percentage of the Latino population 
speaks fluent Spanish, and that many consider it their preferred language, the one chosen for per-
sonal communication, the one selected for speaking with the most precision and power, the one 
used to define the self.”). 
 194 See Mann, 39 P.3d at 133–36 (espousing the majority view that expert jurors may share 
their expertise with other jurors during deliberations). 
 195 See Hard v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 870 F.2d 1454, 1462 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 196 See id. (ruling that a juror’s ability to interpret an X-ray in evidence was not juror miscon-
duct); Mann, 39 P.3d at 132–36 (holding that a juror’s ability to calculate the probability that a 
death was not accidental using expert evidence presented at trial was not juror misconduct). 
 197 Cf. United States v. Cruz, 765 F.2d 1020, 1023 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing favorably the dis-
trict court’s jury instruction that the “real evidence” to be considered is the foreign language re-
cording and not the English-language transcripts of that recording). In a later case in the Eleventh 
Circuit which also involved transcripts and foreign language recorded evidence, the court noted 
that although transcripts could be considered “as substantive evidence to aid the jury[,] . . . the real 
issue presented” was the information contained in a Spanish-language recording. United States v. 
Montor-Torres, 449 F. App’x 820, 822 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cruz, 765 F.2d at 1023). 
 198 See supra notes 150–163 and accompanying text (discussing the majority and minority 
rules concerning expert jurors). 
 199 See Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 704–05 (expressing fears that an expert juror might use their 
specialized knowledge to form an opinion about the case and “communicate[] that expert opinion 
to the rest of the jury panel with the force of private, untested truth as though it were evidence” 
(citations omitted)). 
 200 See Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: To Ask or Not to Ask, That Is 
the Question, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1099, 1119 (2003) (observing that jurors asking questions 
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to abandon their experience and skills at the door of the courtroom, even if 
they have “greater understanding than the average person” of material evi-
dence.201 Similar to any other type of expert juror, multilingual jurors should 
not be subjected to for-cause challenges during voir dire because of their par-
ticular skill set and should be allowed to fully participate in the American jury 
system.202 
B. The District Court’s Decision in Cabrera-Beltran Not to Provide the 
Hernandez Accommodation to Multilingual Jurors Was Unjust 
As articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Hernandez accommoda-
tion allows multilingual prospective jurors to be impanelled with the ability to 
inform the trial court of possible errors in translation or interpretation that 
they observe during the course of a trial.203 When the Hernandez accommo-
dation is requested by a juror and yet still rejected by the trial court, the plu-
rality cautioned that the court’s motivations should be carefully weighed to 
ensure that the decision was racially neutral.204 This accommodation is per-
                                                                                                                           
during trial did not conflict with the adversarial process and actually improved jurors’ understand-
ing of the evidence); see also supra notes 111–117 and accompanying text (discussing how law-
yers and judges can get involved in the process of jurors asking questions); infra notes 210–217 
and accompanying text (same). 
 201 See Mann, 39 P.3d at 133–36; accord Hard, 870 F.2d at 1462. The minority rule agrees 
that expert jurors should not be asked to ignore their own skills, but merely requires that they not 
share that information openly during deliberations. See Maragh, 729 N.E.2d at 704–05. 
 202 See Mann, 39 P.3d at 135 (holding that expert jurors are not subject to for-cause challeng-
es on the basis of their skills, but are subject to peremptory challenges). For information about 
multilingual jurors facing peremptory strikes, see generally Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352. 
 203 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364 (plurality opinion); id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 204 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364 (plurality opinion). At least four of the Justices in Her-
nandez—and perhaps as many as seven—agreed that if the prosecutor opposed the Hernandez 
accommodation, the refusal could be evidence of a racially-biased motivation for the prosecutor’s 
peremptory challenge of multilingual jurors. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364 (plurality opinion); id. at 
379 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although only Justice Anthony Kennedy’s plurality opinion explicit-
ly suggested this interpretation of a prosecutor’s opposition to the Hernandez accommodation, the 
three dissenters actually found that even the peremptory strikes used in that case were not facially 
neutral. See id. at 364 (plurality opinion); id. at 378–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because both the 
plurality opinion and Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissent proposed the same accommodation, and 
because Justice Stevens’ dissent had a lower threshold for holding that the peremptory strikes 
were not race neutral, there is no reason to believe that the dissenters would have interpreted a 
prosecutor’s opposition to the Hernandez accommodation any differently. See id. at 364 (plurality 
opinion); id. at 378–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A trial court should not reject a requested Her-
nandez accommodation lightly; Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion cautioned that any excuse 
given for a strike that would not be accepted as race neutral when proffered by an attorney would 
also not be race neutral when proffered by a court. See id. at 362 (plurality opinion). Justice Ken-
nedy’s observation here was referring to reasons offered in support of peremptory strike, but it is 
also applicable in the context of a court’s refusal to accept a requested Hernandez accommoda-
tion. See id. 
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haps the only protection currently afforded post-Hernandez to multilingual 
jurors who are unwilling or unable to adhere exclusively to English-language 
interpretations and translations, and is therefore an important factor to consid-
er when reviewing for-cause challenges.205 
In the 2011 case United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, however, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Court upheld for-cause strikes against 
multilingual prospective jurors despite recognizing that the district court 
could have offered the jurors the Hernandez accommodation.206 By failing to 
provide multilingual jurors the Hernandez accommodation, the district court 
prevented prospective multilingual jurors from being impanelled.207 On ap-
peal, the Fourth Circuit should have heeded the guidance of the plurality in 
Hernandez and viewed the court’s refusal to provide the Hernandez accom-
modation as potential evidence of the trial court’s lack of race-neutral motiva-
tion.208 In the future, courts should reject the Fourth Circuit’s approach of 
upholding for-cause strikes against multilingual jurors; courts should instead 
offer those jurors the Hernandez accommodation.209 
                                                                                                                           
 205 See id. at 362–64 (plurality opinion) (proposing the Hernandez accommodation but noting 
that otherwise failing to adhere to an English-language interpretation would be grounds for a “val-
id for-cause challenge”); id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality on this 
point); see also Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 749, 750 & n.6 (upholding for-cause challenges of 
multilingual prospective jurors in a case where the Hernandez accommodation was not granted). 
Nevertheless, the systematic use of strikes against all prospective jurors sharing a common language 
may sometimes be evidence that discriminatory motives are at work. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 
371–72 (plurality opinion); id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting the prosecutor’s proffered 
reason in Hernandez for striking Spanish-speakers during voir dire). 
 206 See 660 F.3d at 750 & n.6. 
 207 See supra notes 124, 136–140 and accompanying text (discussing the dismissal of the 
jurors in Cabrera-Beltran). Providing the Hernandez accommodation would have likely amelio-
rated the concerns at least of Prospective Juror Number One who expressed a desire to report 
observed errors. See supra notes 124, 136–140 and accompanying text. If the accommodation was 
offered to one multilingual juror, it almost certainly could have been offered to all three of them. 
See supra notes 124, 136–140 and accompanying text. 
 208 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362, 364 (plurality opinion); supra note 204 and accompany-
ing text (arguing that the dissenters may have implicitly supported the plurality’s position on this 
point even though they did not explicitly address the issue). 
 209 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362, 364; supra note 204 and accompanying text (arguing that 
striking multilingual jurors instead of providing them requested accommodations may not be a 
racially-neutral action). 
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C. Combining Juror Questions and Limited Jury Instructions to Allow for 
More Open Deliberations by Multilingual Jurors 
Once a trial court decides to grant a prospective multilingual juror the 
Hernandez accommodation, it can be implemented in a number of ways.210 
Regardless of the method chosen, a trial court should always require that 
questions from a multilingual juror be directed at the judge, rather than the 
interpreter or translator, to avoid arguments that may interrupt the proceed-
ings.211 
Although one could either allow multilingual jurors to ask questions in 
open court or allow all jurors to submit questions for witnesses on special 
forms, the latter approach has a number of advantages.212 First, it has the ad-
vantage of screening out legally invalid questions, such as those about inad-
missible evidence, before the other jurors hear the questions.213 Second, it 
prevents one juror from potentially dominating the questioning process.214 
This approach may also have the added benefit of helping to ensure that mul-
tilingual jurors do not become alpha jurors.215 Once the concerns of multilin-
                                                                                                                           
 210 See supra notes 101–109 and accompanying text (allowing only multilingual jurors to 
pose questions to the court); supra notes 110–117 and accompanying text (giving all jurors the 
opportunity to ask questions via submitted, anonymous forms). 
 211 See United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1981) (detailing a conflict that 
broke out in open court between a multilingual juror and an interpreter and the judge’s resulting 
instruction to direct further concerns to the court rather than the interpreter); supra notes 101–105, 
108 and accompanying text (discussing Perez). 
 212 See Perez, 658 F.2d at 662–63 (allowing a multilingual juror to ask questions openly to the 
court, which then relayed the questions to the witness via the prosecutor “without incident”); Ben-
nett, supra note 110 (noting that the Eastern District of Texas approach allowed all jurors to sub-
mit questions via anonymous juror question forms and that it had “no downside”); infra notes 
213–214 and accompanying text. See generally Alison K. Bennett, Allowing Jurors to Ask Ques-
tions During Trial: Pros and Cons, BATTLE BLAWG (Apr. 11, 2012), http://thebattleblawg.com/
2012/04/11/juror-questions-pros-and-cons/, archived at http://perma.cc/NV88-34RY (observing po-
tential advantages and disadvantages of letting jurors ask questions). 
 213 See Perez, 658 F.2d at 662–63 (observing that the judge should decide which of the juror’s 
questions to present to the witness or the interpreter to avoid asking questions which are not al-
lowed by law and could end up tainting the verdict in the case). 
 214 See Diane Diamond, Let All Jurors Ask Questions!, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2013, 8:43 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diane-dimond/let-all-jurors-ask-questi_b_3003224.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/9VPZ-2BA4 (observing that a concern about jurors asking questions direct-
ly is that one of them could “dominate the questioning and alienate others who might then disengage 
from the testimony”); Bennett, supra note 212 (noting that one potential disadvantage of letting ju-
rors ask questions directly is that one juror may be overly talkative and drag out the length of the 
trial). 
 215 See Charles Montaldo, Jurors Asking Questions During Trial, ABOUT.COM (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2015), http://crime.about.com/od/Crime_101/a/jurors-questions.htm, archived at http://perma.
cc/Q7WT-VZ3D (suggesting that when jurors get to ask questions, all jurors become better informed 
about the subject, thereby avoiding the tendency of less-informed jurors to fall in lockstep behind 
expert jurors). Moreover, when the judge decides which questions get presented to attorneys, it may 
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gual jurors about a translation or interpretation have been aired before the 
court, the observed differences can be dealt with more openly as part of the 
adversarial process.216 The knowledge of the multilingual juror will then be 
something all of the jurors may equally consider.217 
In cases involving a single, official interpretation or translation, allowing 
juror questions alone may not be enough; the judge may have to provide spe-
cial jury instructions about the official record of the proceedings.218 In such a 
case, after resolving potential errors spotted by the multilingual jurors, the 
jury could be instructed by the court to abide by the resulting official record 
of the evidence rather than rely on the multilingual jurors’ own translations or 
interpretations.219 This is the system used in the state courts of California and 
Florida, and it could be just as effective in federal district courts.220 Even 
these state rules should be relaxed to follow the majority rule on expert jurors 
when multiple competing translations or interpretations are at issue, thereby 
freeing multilingual jurors to discuss that evidence during jury delibera-
tions.221 
                                                                                                                           
reduce or prevent a single juror from dominating the questioning and potentially boring or exclud-
ing other jurors from the process. See Diamond, supra note 214. One leading scholar on Latinos 
and the American legal system theorizes that multilingual jurors may lack sufficient social clout to 
become alpha jurors precisely because of a trust deficit that language minorities face when inter-
acting with monolingual English-speakers. See Perea, supra note 51, at 46. Unlike a person whose 
expertise is associated with a professional degree, being an ethnic minority may come with a low-
er social status, not a greater one. See Mushlin, supra note 141, at 270, 272–73 (observing that 
jurors who are experts by virtue of their professions may have “undue influence” on jury delibera-
tions); Perea, supra note 51, at 45–46; see also Hsieh, supra note 73, at 1197 (concluding that 
multilingual jurors are unlikely to become alpha jurors solely because of their language skills). 
 216 See Bennett, supra note 110 (noting that attorneys had the opportunity to provide advice to 
the judge on which questions to pick and could “ask follow-up questions, which they did about 
one-third of the time”). 
 217 See Montaldo, supra note 215 (“When jurors’ questions are answered, it helps create an 
environment of equality[,] and each juror can participate and contribute to the deliberations rather 
than being dictated to by those who appear to have all the answers.”). This should counteract the 
fear of the Fourth Circuit in Cabrera-Beltran that if multilingual jurors were the only jurors who 
understood and considered foreign language testimony directly, they would be considering differ-
ent evidence than other monolingual, English-speaking jurors. See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 
750. 
 218 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that multilingual 
jurors may be impanelled and given jury instructions about the official nature of the English inter-
pretation while at the same time receiving the Hernandez accommodation). 
 219 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (discussing California and Florida pattern 
jury instructions, which allow jurors to ask questions about translations and interpretations, but 
instruct that the resulting English translation or interpretation controls). 
 220 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (discussing state systems which offer their 
own equivalents of the Hernandez accommodation). 
 221 See Hard, 870 F.2d at 1462 (holding that an expert juror was permitted to share his 
knowledge during deliberations); Mann, 39 P.3d at 132–36 (same). If the parties cannot agree on 
what should be included in a single English-language transcript of a foreign-language recording, 
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When there is an issue with a prepared translation in the case and a mul-
tilingual juror disagrees with that translation, this may present a more com-
plex problem.222 Although an interpreter can quickly pose a new question to a 
live witness, a translator may not have ready access to a willing witness who 
is able to answer questions about the contents of the document that was trans-
lated.223 In determining whether a translator should maintain or revise their 
translation in light of a juror’s observations, the translator should, at a mini-
mum, refer to a district approved foreign language reference dictionary to 
resolve potential discrepancies.224 Although any system of accommodating 
multilingual jurors may require attention to details such as these, such minor 
concerns are no reason to avoid application of the Hernandez accommoda-
tion.225 
CONCLUSION 
Unlike other expert jurors, multilingual jurors are often expected to ig-
nore the full range of their skills when considering material evidence present-
ed at trial. In many courts, multilingual jurors may be struck for cause be-
cause they might be unable to adhere unquestioningly to a potentially errone-
                                                                                                                           
in some jurisdictions, each party may submit competing transcripts and attack the validity of the 
opposing party’s transcript. Compare Cruz, 765 F.2d at 1023 (allowing for competing transcripts), 
and United States v. Llinas, 603 F.2d 506, 509–10 (5th Cir. 1979) (same), with United States v. 
Upia-Frias, 422 F. App’x 78, 82 (3d Cir. 2011) (ruling that competing English-language tran-
scripts of Spanish-language recordings should be excluded due to a lack of a fair alternate rule that 
could resolve the conflict). Multilingual jurors should be free to discuss which of the competing 
translations or interpretations they prefer and why with other jurors; that evidence is already on 
record at the trial and therefore the discussion would not be introducing extraneous prejudicial 
information into the deliberations. See Hard, 870 F.2d at 1462; Mann, 39 P.3d at 132–36. In the 
case of a foreign language recording, the recording is still the “real evidence” at trial, not the Eng-
lish transcripts of the recording. See Cruz, 765 F.2d at 1023; accord Montor-Torres, 449 F. App’x 
at 822 (“[T]ranscripts may be used as substantive evidence to aid the jury in determining the real 
issue presented, the content and the meaning of the tape recording.” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Cruz, 765 F.2d at 1023)). 
 222 Interview with R. Michael Cassidy, Professor, Boston College Law School, in Newton, 
Mass. (Nov. 25, 2013). Recall that a “translation” refers to the English-language version of a for-
eign-language text, whereas an “interpretation” is the English-language version of foreign-
language speech. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 223 Interview with R. Michael Cassidy, supra note 222. 
 224 See ESSENTIAL DICTIONARIES FOR COURT INTERPRETERS, N.J. COURTS (2008), available at 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/interpreters/dict.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/CWX8-KK3P (con-
taining a list of English and foreign language dictionaries that should be used in the state of New 
Jersey). 
 225 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364 (plurality opinion) (proposing the Hernandez accommo-
dation); id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); Perez, 658 F.2d at 663 (describing how a judge 
developed an accommodation like that proposed in Hernandez which worked “without incident” 
to resolve a contentious situation in the courtroom). 
2015] Multilingual Perspective Jurors and For-Cause Strikes 1285 
ous English-language interpretation or translation. Instead of being struck 
because they might detect such errors, multilingual jurors should be offered 
the opportunity to ask questions when they perceive these errors, allowing 
their concerns to be aired openly as part of the adversarial process. Only then 
should they be asked to abide by the resulting clarified interpretation or trans-
lation. Additionally, when both parties offer competing interpretations or 
translations of foreign language evidence, multilingual jurors should not be 
forced to sit by “gagged” during jury deliberations; they should be allowed to 
openly weigh in on the credibility of each party’s proffered version of the ev-
idence. Multilingual jurors should be allowed to use their skills to consider all 
of the evidence, just like any other expert juror in the majority of jurisdic-
tions. Fear of foreign languages should not be used as a silent excuse to prej-
udice justice in our courts. 
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